TP-Link and the Red Scare

Is the U.S. Government’s Stance on Tech “Selective Enforcement”?

The recent push by multiple U.S. agencies to ban TP-Link products, citing national security risks, is a significant move. The stated concern is that TP-Link’s ties to China could make it subject to laws compelling cooperation with state intelligence, potentially turning millions of home routers into a national security vulnerability.

This is not a new playbook. We saw the same rationale applied to:

• Kaspersky (Russia): Banned from all U.S. government systems and, more recently, from all U.S. sales, due to fears the Russian government could exploit its deep access to U.S. computers.
• Huawei & ZTE (China): Banned from U.S. telecom networks over concerns that their 5G equipment could contain “backdoors” for Chinese state-sponsored espionage.

In each case, the core argument is risk: a company domiciled in an adversary nation could be compelled to act against U.S. interests.

It’s important to understand that while Russia and China are oft branded as unusual for having these ‘intelligence cooperation’ laws, the truth is companies in the US are under the same requirement (FISA section 702), as are companies in the United Kingdom (Investigatory Powers Act 2016), Australia (Assistance and Access Act 2018), France (French Intelligence Law 2015 & 2021), Canada (CSIS Act)…. I can go on here but in truth almost all major powers have these laws. The only real difference, and this is a stretch, is that China’s law is broad (all citizens) and unchecked by theory that neither country is considered to have an independent judiciary.

Our national security lens doesn’t seem to be applied universally. This raises the question: is this a consistent policy or a case of selective enforcement?

Consider these counter-examples:

1. The “Trusted Partners”: Samsung, Nokia, & Ericsson These companies are also foreign. Samsung (South Korea), Nokia (Finland), and Ericsson (Sweden) are, in fact, the dominant forces in networking and mobile tech. Yet, they aren’t treated as threats. On the contrary, the U.S. government actively promotes them as the “trusted” and “Clean Network” alternatives to Huawei. Samsung’s technology is even approved for classified U.S. military use. The key difference? They are based in allied nations.
2. The “Critical Asset”: Nvidia The U.S. government’s relationship with Nvidia (an American company) shows the inverse of the TP-Link problem. The national security concern isn’t that Nvidia is a threat to the U.S., but that its technology (advanced AI chips) is so powerful, it’s a threat if it falls into China’s hands. The government isn’t banning Nvidia’s products; it’s banning Nvidia from exporting its best technology to China, treating it as a strategic national asset to be protected.

The Inconsistency is the Policy

When we look at this landscape, the policy becomes clear. The issue isn’t just about “security” in the abstract. It’s about geopolitics.

• Tech from adversary nations (China, Russia) is treated as a potential weapon.
• Tech from allied nations (South Korea, Finland) is treated as a strategic partnership.
• Tech from home (USA) is treated as a critical asset to be guarded.

This isn’t to say the risks from TP-Link or Huawei aren’t real. But it suggests the “national security” label is being applied selectively based on the country of origin.

From a pure cybersecurity and national security perspective, this is a flawed model. True security demands a consistent, equitable standard. We should be vetting all technology—regardless of its flag—based on verifiable security, supply chain transparency, and adherence to privacy laws.

If a device is a vulnerability, it’s a vulnerability whether it’s from China, South Korea, or the U.S. A robust national security framework shouldn’t just be a tool of foreign policy; it should treat all potential risks equally.

What are your thoughts? Is this a prudent geopolitical strategy or a dangerously inconsistent security policy?

#NationalSecurity #CyberSecurity #TechPolicy #TPLink #Huawei #Nvidia #Geopolitics #RiskManagement #racter